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W ARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A 
COLLEGE DORMITORY 
RONALD J. BACIGAL * 
STUDENT CONDUCT is as much a part of the collegiate experience as intellectual pursuit, and regulation of student conduct has been a 
concern of university officials for as long as there have been students and 
universities. Until the 1960s the courts had few occasions to concern 
themselves with the regulation of student conduct; and, university officials 
were free to take any action short of action that was arbitrary and 
capricious.1 University officials were deemed to stand in loco parentis 
and thus could make and enforce any regulation for the physical training, 
moral enrichment, and betterment of their pupils that a parent would 
make for the same purpose.2 This view of life in the Ivory Tower may 
or may not have been an accurate appraisal of actual campus life in 
the past; but, it clearly bore no relation to campus life in the 1960s. As 
one federal district court judge observed: 
I take notice that particularly in recent years the universities have 
become theaters for stormy and often violent protests over such 
matters as war and peace, racial discrimination in our cities and else-
where, and the quality of American life; that this phenomenon adds 
new and unanticipated dimensions to the regulation of conduct in the 
universities; and that those charged with governance of these institu-
tions have been struggling to preserve many competing values involved.3 
To some extent this struggle to preserve many competing values was 
transferred from university officials to the courts when Dixon v. Bd. 
of Educ.4 abandoned the judiciary's traditional reluctance to examine 
academic due process.5 In Dixon the court stated that "[w]henever a 
• B.S., Concord College; J.D., Washington and Lee University, School of Law; 
Diploma, University of Amsterdam; Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of 
Law, University of Richmond. 
1 The president and faculty of a university necessarily have "inherent general power 
to maintain order and to exclude those who are detrimental to the student body and 
the institution's well-being, so long as they exercise sound discretion and do not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously." Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, 235 (S.D. W.Va. 
1968). 
2 Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924). 
3 Soalin v. Kauffman, 295 F.Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wisc. 1968). Although the 1960s 
may have been a watershed in student activism, there is not yet any basis for believing 
that the 1970s will mark a period of tranquility. Bayer & Astin, Campus Unrest, 
1970-71: Was It Really All That Quiet? 52 Enuc. REc. 301-313 (Fall 1971). 
4294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
5 In Zanders v. Bd. of Ed., 281 F.Supp. 747, 760 (W.D. La. 1968), the court expressed 
some apparent impatience with the failure of university officials to accord students 
their rights under due process of law. 
If minimum standards of fairness, having been repeatedly articulated for over 
50 years, are not afforded to students in disciplinary cases, then, as is becoming 
the rule rather than the exception in all fields today, courts, state and federal, 
(422) 
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governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution 
requires that the act be consonant with due process of law." 6 The holding 
of Dixon is limited to state-supported colleges 7 and is vague regarding 
specific rights included under due process; 8 but, the decision did clearly 
establish that disciplinary action of university officials was subject to 
judicial review.9 
Dixon established only the perimeters of judicial review, recognizing 
that a student has a right to procedural safeguards greater than those 
present in an informal interview, but Jess than all the safeguards inherent 
in a criminal proceeding.10 The specific rights embodied between these two 
perimeters are uncertain and there has been extensive discussion of exactly 
what due process rights a student possesses.11 The scope of this article is 
confined to an examination of one of those rights, the fourth amendment 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. There are relatively 
few cases dealing with the search of a student's dormitory room 12 and the 
will draft rules on an ad hoc, a case by case, basis to insure that rights of 
students adequately are protected. 
The federal district court for the western district of Missouri so willingly plunged 
into the struggle that rather than evolve the standards on a case by case basis, it 
promulgated a General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance i11 
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968). 
6 Dixon v. Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Dixon]. 
7 Public universities are considered to be instruments of the state, thus the action of 
public university officials is state action and the students are entitled to that degree 
of due process required by the fourteenth amendment. With private universities there 
is a lack of state action thus the fourteenth amendment does not apply. Courts have 
held that attendance at a private school is not a right but a privilege which may be 
discontinued at the option of the university, and there are no constitutional limitations 
on the exercise of that option. For a summary of existing law and arguments in favor 
of applying the fourteenth amendment to private universities see An Overview: The 
Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795 (1970). 
a E.g., Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and 
Practice, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763 (1970); Van Alstyne, The Student as University 
Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582 (1968); Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 
(1968); Note, 3 GA. L. REv. 426 (1969). 
9 "[W]ith the exception of dictum in one district court case, there has been no 
challenge by any court, state or federal, to the basic proposition for which Dixon 
stands, that students at a public institution of higher learning do have constitutional 
rights that the courts will recognize and protect." Wright, The Constitution on the 
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wright]. But it is 
not as clear that legislatures will accept this basic proposition as readily as the courts. 
E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Supp. 1973) (providing for expulsion without any 
provision for a hearing). 
10 To require a "full dress judicial hearing" would be "impractical and detrimental to 
the educational atmosphere and functions of a university." Goldberg v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 881-82, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (Cal. App. 
1967); accord, Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 
1968). 
11 Supra note 8. 
12 Before the age of the student as a militant litigator few cases reached the courts 
because universities preferred to handle matters quietly within the university and thus 
avoid any publicity which could damage the university's image. The university would 
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holdings are frequently unclear because they mix consideration of 
the existence of the right to privacy with the methods of protecting the 
right. It is suggested that some of the confusion could be avoided if 
the courts were to consider first whether the fourth amendment right 
to privacy applies to a university dormitory room, and then determine 
what procedures are applicable in relation to the right: e.g., the 
requirement for a search warrant; the standards of probable cause; and 
the application of the exclusionary rule.13 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The first question the courts must consider is whether there are any 
limitations on when and how university officials may search a dormitory 
room. Since the fourth amendment has no application to searches and 
seizures conducted by private individuals,14 the courts have jurisdiction to 
review only state action infringing on the constitutional right to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In spite of indirect public financial 
support and state regulation of private universities, the courts have thus 
far held that the actions of private university officials are not to be 
considered as a form of state action.15 Thus this article is concerned only 
with the actions of public university officials, since such action is state 
action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.16 
If the university is deemed a public university, the courts must then 
consider whether the constitutional right to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy 17 exists in a dormitory room, thereby affording the resident fourth 
"simply exile the tainted student from the academic community. Once administrators 
had accomplished their goal, the matter was usually forgotten by all concerned." 
Armstrong, College Search and Seizure: Privacy and Due Process Problems on 
Campus, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 537, 552 n.85 (1969). 
13 In oral argument before the Supreme Court on United States v. Calandra, 94 
S. Ct. 613 (1974), argued Oct. 11, 1973, Chief Justice Burger stated "I do not recall 
any case where the court has discussed [the exclusionary rule] except as a means of 
keeping the system healthy .... It is spoken of as a benefit to the system of justice-
not to the individual .... It is not a right of the individual." 14 CB.IM. L. RPn. 4045 
(Oct. 17, 1973). 
14 Although there is some academic debate as to whether the fourth amendment 
applies to searches by private citizens, see e.g. United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 
306, 313 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1967), the law is fairly well settled that private individuals 
acting independent of government involvement may conduct a search which would be 
unconstitutional if performed by the government. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 475 (1921). 
15 See note 7 supra. But see Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 
1962). In Hammond v. Univ. of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965), the court 
noted that 
"[a)lthough the University of Tampa is not a state or city institution in the 
usual sense, its establishment was largely made possible by the use of a surplus 
city building and the use of other city land leased for the University purposes . 
. . . [T]he City's involvement in the establishment and maintenance was of such 
a nature as to require a holding that "state" action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment was involved in the denial of appellants' rights. 
16 Supra note 7. 
17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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amendment protection against unreasonable searches by university officials. 
Professor Charles Wright has contended that there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a dormitory room, thus the courts need never 
concern themselves with searches of dormitory rooms.1B Such an approach 
would certainly simplify matters for the courts, and in the search and 
seizure area, would signal a return to pre-Dixon days. Anyone who has 
ever resided in a college dormitory is aware of the practical limitations 
on his privacy; but, can it be said as a matter of law that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy? 19 The various theories advanced 
against a reasonable expectation of privacy are considered below. 
ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The courts have avoided classifying a dormitory resident's status in 
the classic terminology of property Iaw,20 thus some commentators have 
suggested that by casting their powers in property terms universities could 
preserve an option to enter at will.21 Such a theory diametrically 
contravenes Justice Stewart's view that: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ... But what he seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.22 
The subtleties of the law of property in distinguishing a license from 
an interest in property should have no significance within the context of 
the fourth amendment. "Anyone legitimately on premises where a search 
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its 
fruits are proposed to be used against him." 23 Although it is arguable 
whether the dormitory resident and the university stand in a tenant-
landlord relationship,24 it is clear that the student possesses at least the 
rights of a lodger.25 The complete relationship between a dormitory 
1s Wright, supra note 9. Cf. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 
284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Commonwealth 
v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970). 
19 ''To suggest that a student who lives ofi campus in a boarding house is protected 
but that one who occupies a dormitory room waives his constitutional liberties is at 
war with reason, logic and law." People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (1st Dist. 
1968). 
20 E.g., Moore, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Perhaps the courts seek to avoid 
collateral complications that could arise from according students a status as a tenant, 
licensee, or lodger. 
21 E.g., Knowles, Crime Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional Dimensions, 4 
J. FAMILY L. 151, 164 (1964). See also United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921, 
924 (E.D. Pa. 1967); People v. Overton, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). 
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). 
23Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). 
24 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 
KY. L.J. 643, 681 (1966). 
25 The fourth amendment protects the right of privacy in rented houses, Chapman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); rooms in boarding houses, McDonald v. United 
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resident and the university encompasses much more than the ordinary 
lodger-proprietor relationship, but the additional relations between student 
and university should be considered on their own merits, and should not 
be viewed as destroying the traditional fourth amendment rights of a 
lodger. Inherent in the lodger-proprietor relationship is the proprietor's 
duty to respect the lodger's privacy in the premises. 
CONSENT-WAIVER 
Obviously there is no invasion of privacy when one freely and 
voluntarily consents to an entry. Thus it has been argued that even if a 
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist in regard to a dormitory 
room, the right is waived when the student consents to dormitory regula-
tions which allow university officials to enter at will for inspection 
purposes. 26 The difficulty with the consent theory is in determining whether 
a student's acquiescence to dormitory regulations can be classified as 
consent, freely and voluntarily given. It is clear that the burden of 
establishing free and voluntary consent rests upon the prosecution; 27 but 
it is not as clear, within the context of student rights, what facts are 
required to meet this burden. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,28 the 
Supreme Court defined the test for voluntary consent thusly: "[T]he 
question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied is a question of fact to 
be determined from the totality of all circumstances." 29 The Court went 
on to make an interesting distinction between the standard for consent to 
a search (factual determination of voluntariness) vis-a-vis the standard for 
waiver of certain constitutional rights ("an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege") .30 The Court held that the 
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); and hotel rooms, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 
(1964). In Commonwealth v. McClosky, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A2d 271 (1970), 
the court reasoned that a dormitory room is analogous to an apartment or hotel 
room, and affords the occupant a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
26 A typical regulation was that cited in Moore, 284 F. Supp. 725, 728 (M.D. Ala. 
1968): "The college reserves the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes. If the 
administration deems it necessary the room may be searched and the occupant 
required to open his personal baggage and any other personal material which is 
sealed." Even absent such an explicit provision, courts have held that every dormitory 
resident impliedly consents to entry by university officials. "It is implicit in the rules 
that the appellant had agreed that the master, in the performance of his duties in 
upholding the high disciplinary standards and integrity of the school, might enter the 
room." People v. Kelley, 195 Cal. App.2d 72, 77-78, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (Ct. 
App. 1961). The usual corollary of a student's consent to an entry by university 
officials is that the university officials may then consent to entry by the police. People 
v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (1st Dist. 1968), rejected the corollary thusly: [E]ven 
if the doctrine of implied consent were imported into this case, the consent is given, 
not to police officials, but to the University and the latter cannot fragmentize, share 
or delegate it." 
27 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543; 548 (1968). 
28 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
29 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Schneckloth). 
so Id. at 235-38. 
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stricter standard for waiver had "[a]lmost without exception ... been 
applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal 
defendant in order to preserve a fair triaJ."31 The Court noted "that there 
is no universal standard that must be applied in every situation where a 
person forgoes a constitutional right," 32 and that 
[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair 
criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a "knowing" 
and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application 
of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the 
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.33 
If Schneckloth is accepted at face value, it seems clear that the university 
need not inform a dormitory resident of his right to privacy before 
eliciting a waiver of that right. 
However, the factual situation before the Court in Schneckloth dealt 
with the consent to a search, given on the scene and during an investiga-
tion. The practical limitations of obtaining consent in such a factual 
situation clearly played a part in the decision, for the Court noted that: 
Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of 
law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or 
in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured 
conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to 
search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative 
police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further 
suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in question-
ing persons at the scene of a crime. (Emphasis added.) 34 
Obviously, none of the above characteristics of a "normal consent 
search" would apply to a university requirement that all dormitory 
residents consent to all future searches. The university is not acting under 
"informal and unstructured conditions." The circumstances prompting a 
search have not developed "quickly" nor is the request "a logical extension 
of investigative police questioning." The university is not investigating 
"further suspicious circumstances" and is not following up "leads 
developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime." Nothing could 
be further removed from the factual situation in Schneckloth than the 
structured conditions under which a student is admitted to a university 
and accepted as a dormitory resident. The university is not eliciting 
consent to a specific search which is a part of an investigation; rather, the 
university seeks complete abandonment of the right to privacy and consent 
to all future entries. Schneckloth may have been correct in observing that: 
"It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured 
31 Jd. at 237. 
32 Jd. at245. 
33 Jd. at 241. 
34 Jd. at 231-32. 
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context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the 
evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of examination .... " 
required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional 
right.35 But, it does not seem unrealistic, within the typical setting of 
student registration, to require the university to inform the student that he 
is being asked to waive an important constitutional right. At registration a 
student is faced with a multitude of forms and informational materials, 
and it would not place an unreasonable burden upon the university to 
require that the materials include a written waiver form explaining to the 
student what rights he must surrender in order to qualify as a dormitory 
resident. Assuming that such a wholly prospective and complete 
abandonment of a constitutional right does not violate public policy,36 the 
university could then forcefully argue that the written waiver constituted 
an intelligent relinquishment of a known right. 
If the concept of waiver is inapplicable to a university dormitory 
situation, then the less strict standard for consent will be applied and the 
university will be required to establish only that the consent was voluntary 
and not the result of coercion.37 However, it is doubtful if the university 
can meet even this lesser burden. In many universities first and second 
year students are required to live in a dormitory; and, they are, therefore, 
required to accept dormitory regulations which eliminate the right to 
privacy. Even when residence in a university dormitory is a matter 
of choice, the student has no right to negotiate on the terms of the 
dormitory regulations; thus, he is coerced into giving up his fourth 
amendment rights. Of course, it can always be argued that the student 
does have a choice because he is free to choose not to reside in a 
dormitory, or in fact may choose not to attend a university. While such 
a choice may be voluntary within the literal definition of voluntariness,38 
it is not the type of voluntary choice contemplated by the Constitution. 
"[T]he State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon 
35 Id. at 245. 
36 The courts would have to consider the wisdom of allowing a person to enter into 
an agreement whereby he surrenders his constitutional rights in future situations which 
he cannot foresee at the time of the waiver. This may be a purely academic question 
since it is difficult to conceive of anyone making such a general waiver of rights in 
the absence of some pressure or coercion being applied. If there is coercion, even 
in the form of withholding a privilege, then "the rule is that the right to continue the 
exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon 
the grantee's submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the 
provisions of the federal Constitution." United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. 
Co., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931). 
:n Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248. 
38 In Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224, n. 7, the court noted that the presence of disagree-
able alternatives does not eliminate the possibility of choice. "As between the rack and 
a confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is 
nonetheless a voluntary choice." 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 826 (J. Chadbourn .rev. 
1970). But in determining the legal standard for voluntary choice, the court noted 
that "neither linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the 
meaning of 'voluntariness.'" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224. 
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renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process."39 If it 
is accepted that a dormitory resident possesses the constitutional right 
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, then "a tax-supported 
public college may not compel a 'waiver' of that right as a condition 
precedent to admission." 40 Any consent obtained under such a condition 
must be considered involuntary. 
IN Loco PARENTIS 
As noted earlier, the actions of public university officials are to be 
considered as a form of state action. 41 But the in loco parentis theory 
contends that the fourth amendment is limited to a specific form of state 
action, i.e., state action in fulfilling the police function of collecting 
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. University officials are not 
serving the police function but rather the parental duty of caring for a 
wayward child. 42 Thus, the argument goes, the student has no need for the 
protection of the fourth amendment because the possible university 
sanctions against the student are much less severe than the sanctions facing 
the criminal defendant,43 and the motivation of university officials 
conducting the search is totally different from the motivation of the 
police.44 The obvious rebuttal to this argument is that the university 
sanction may indeed· be severe since suspension or expulsion from college 
may prevent admission to other institutions thus amounting to a lifelong 
stigma.45 Should this stigma prevent a student from ever attaining a college 
degree, it may cost the student up to $178,000 in potential lifetime 
income.46 As for the university officials' motivation, the initial problem is 
in factually determing subjective motivation. But even if university officials 
could establish that they were motivated by the noblest of considerations, 
motivation should never be accepted as a justification for a violation of 
constitutional rights. It is hard to resist the cliche that the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions; but, one need only look to the "Watergate" 
39 Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156. 
40 Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729. 
41 Supra note 7. 
42 See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
43 See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F; Supp. 622, 628 (W.D. Mo. 1968), 
where the court held that "the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the criminal 
law processes .... For, while the expelled student may suffer damaging effects, some-
times irreparable, to his educational, social, and economic future, he or she may not 
be imprisoned, fined, disenfranchised, or subjected to probationary supervision." 
44Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 
217 (D. Me. 1970); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 
(1970). All of the above cases held, at least in dicta, that a university can conduct a 
warrantless search for educational or proprietary purposes but not "for the primary 
purpose of a criminal prosecution." Piazzola at 289 (emphasis added). 
45 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rule, Rights, and Responsibilities. 54 CALIP. 
L. REV. 23, 36-37 (1966). 
46 Based on projected average lifetime income of males with educational backgrounds 
ranging from a high school diploma to a college degree. 1962 Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 119; See also 1972 Statistical Abstract of the United States 114. 
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situation to observe where justification based on high motivation can 
lead. Also, there is really no need to grapple with the philosophical 
question of whether the end can justify the means, when it is clear that 
the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect "the common-law right 
of a man to privacy in his home .... To say that a man suspected of 
crime has a right to protection against a search of his home without 
a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a crime has no such 
protection, is a fantastic absurdity. " 47 In considering the fourth amend-
ment right to privacy, subjective motivation is simply irrelevant. "It is the 
individual's interest in privacy which the Amendment protects, and that 
would not appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading officers." 48 
Perhaps the most glaring weakness of the in loco parentis theory 
is that focusing on subjective motivation ignores the very practical 
consideration that breaches of university regulations frequently constitute 
crimes (e.g., unlawful possession of drugs) and thus subject the student 
to prosecution regardless of the original purpose of the search. It is 
of no comfort to a student facing criminal prosecution to be told 
that the university officials had not originally contemplated any criminal 
prosecution. "The intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or 
excuse the result." 49 In Mathis v. United States 50 the Supreme Court held 
that when in an investigation of a civil matter, there exists the possibility 
of criminal sanctions, even though not contemplated, the person should be 
given Miranda warnings before interrogation. Since the mere possibility 
of criminal prosecution is enough to trigger the applicability of the fifth 
amendment, there appears no reason why the possibility of criminal 
sanctions should not also make the fourth amendment applicable, 
regardless of the subjective intent of the individuals conducting the search. 
PuBLIC INTERESTS 
Perhaps the most forthright argument against a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a dormitory room is the simple realization that the right to 
privacy is not absolute and must at times yield to a greater public interest. 
The fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches, and 
because of the public interest in a given situation, a warrantless search 
may be considered reasonable.51 Further, it has been stated that a large 
47 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Supreme 
Court recognized this principle in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 
(1967), where the court held that "it is surely anomalous to say that the individual 
and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior." 
48 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
49 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 477 (1947) (Burton, J., 
dissenting). 
so 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
51 Such an approach is based on the theory that the warrant clause and the reason-
ableness clause of the fourth amendment are independent. Thus the constitutional 
validity of a search can be judged solely on the basis of its reasonableness, regardless 
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concentration of youth within the campus setting tends to create a 
dynamic situation likely to produce criminal conduct.52 To deal with these 
dynamic situations university officials must be given "reasonable" authority 
even if the authority to some extent infringes on "minor" interests 
protected by the fourth amendment.53 One can certainly differ with the 
opening premise-that college "youth" are more prone to criminal 
conduct. It may not even be accurate to classify college students as youth 
since in many jurisdictions the age of 18 is now recognized as constituting 
legal majority, and only seven percent of total college enrollment is below 
the age of 18.54 Even if statistics do indicate a greater likelihood of crime 
on campus, mere statistical probability has never been a legitimate basis 
for conducting a search.55 To recognize mere statistical probability would 
allow the search of any home in a high crime area on nothing more 
specific than crime report statistics for the year. 
A further weakness of the "public interest" theory is the tendency to 
generalize about situations rather than deal with specifics. The argument 
is advanced that a college campus is such a volatile situation that the right 
to privacy must be put aside; yet, University of Texas officials have 
preserved discipline without ever authorizing a search, and the University 
voluntarily relinquished any claim to the power to authorize a search.56 
The balancing of public interests and private rights should not take place 
in the general abstract where courts must deal with such concepts as a 
youth's disposition to mischief. The balancing should be done through the 
warrant procedure where a specific situation can be examined, and if 
of the feasibility of procuring a warrant. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56 (1950). The validity of Rabinowitz is highly doubtful in light of Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the court held that warrantless searches were 
"per se unreasonable" subject only to well recognized exceptions. · 
52 A college dormitory brings together a large group of energetic, adventurous and 
often irresponsible young persons. Englehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 300 S.W. 268 
(1927). 
53 In other words, if the regulation--or, in the absence of a regulation, the action 
of the college authorities-is necessary in aid of the basic respo11S1'bility of the 
institution regarding discipline and the maintenance of an "educational atmos-
phere," then it will be presumed facially responsible despite the fact that it may 
infringe to some extent on the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights 
of the students. 
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729. This reasoning is similar to that in Frank v. Maryland, 
359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959), where the court held that fire, health and housing inspec-
tions are socially necessary and are reasonable because they "touch at most upon the 
periphery of the important interests safeguarded by •.. [the fourth amendment as 
applied through the] Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion ... " 
Frank was overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387, U.S. 523 (1967). 
M Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public 
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 1, 17-18 (1965). 
See, People v. Cohen, 57 Misc.2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968), where the court 
emphasized that university students are adults. 
55 An invasion of privacy cannot "be justified on the grounds that there is a statistical 
chance that a violation may be discovered." Commonwealth v. Swanger, 300 A.2d 66, 
69 (1973). See T. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 217-18 (1966). 
56 Wright, supra note 9. 
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necessary the determination made that in this particular situation the right 
to privacy must yield to a greater public interest.57 As the Supreme Court 
stated in Camara v. Municipal Court: "[A]n argument that the public 
interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But 
we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage 
at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be 
made without a warrant." 58 Whether the right to privacy must yield to 
public interest in a particular situation is a question to be confronted 
each time a warrant is requested for the search of a specific area. This 
question should not be preempted by a general rule eliminating the 
need to examine a specific factual situation. It is simply not necessary 
or reasonable to announce the general rule that, no matter whatever 
other factors are present, one can never have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a dormitory room.59 
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
If it is accepted that the fourth amendment does protect a student's 
right to privacy in a dormitory room, the next area of concern is whether 
the right can be set aside only pursuant to a valid search warrant. "It is 
well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search 
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se 
unreasonable ... 'subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.' " 60 The recognized situations where a warrant 
has generally not been required are: consent,61 incident to arrest,62 stop 
and frisk,63 emergency,64 incident to arrest made inside a house,65 and 
plain view.66 If a search by university officials falls within one of these 
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement the warrantless search 
will be valid. The current concern is whether university officials are 
covered by a distinct exception, i.e., will nothing other than the fact of 
the search being authorized by university officials justify bypassing the 
warrant procedure. All exceptions to the warrant requirement are based 
57 Absent emergency or exceptional circumstances, warrantless administrative inspec-
tions are unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
158 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). 
59 "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. 
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but 
none they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
60Schneckloth v. Bustanionte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
61 fd. at 218; Bumper v. North Carolina, 381U.S.543 (1968). 
62 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
63 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
· 64 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
65 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
66Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
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on necessity,67 thus it must be determined if there is anything unique about 
a college dormitory necessitating the elimination of the requirement for a 
warrant issued by a magistrate. No court has squarely confronted this 
question although Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.68 
held that a warrantless search was not violative of the fourth amendment 
because it was "necessary in aid of the basic responsibility of the 
institution regarding discipline and the maintenance of an 'educational 
atmosphere.' " 69 While Moore determined that the act of searching was 
necessary, it did not address itself to the issue of why it was necessary 
to bypass the warrant procedure. Thus Moore evaded the thrust of 
Camara v. Municipal Court 70 which recognized that individual rights may 
have to yield to a valid interest, but this determination is to be made 
by a magistrate not by the person conducting the search. The only time 
that the magistrate may be bypassed is when "the burden of obtaining 
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search.'' 71 Thus the question Moore did not address itself to is whether 
obtaining a warrant would have frustrated the university's purpose of 
maintaining discipline and an educational atmosphere. 
Although the courts have not had an opportunity to rule on the 
contention, it has been argued that the psychological effect of university 
officials confronting students with search warrants would destroy the trust 
and cooperativeness of an "educational atmosphere." 72 Although there 
exists no empirical data on the psychological effect of a search warrant, it 
seems highly doubtful that the modem student would prefer to entrust 
protection of his rights to the benevolence of university officials rather than 
have university officials observe constitutional procedures. Rather 
than create an unpleasant educational atmosphere the "provision of 
procedural protection should enhance a school's reputation for fairness 
and thus prove a positive benefit." 73 A search warrant would indicate to a 
student that the university official was not acting on whim or prejudice, 
but pursuant to a lawful warrant issued by a neutral party-a judicial 
officer. Whatever the cause, Ralph Naderism, the Civil Rights Movement, 
etc., it seems clear that today's college student places more faith in the 
judicial system than in any other public institution of our society. 
Aside from the psychological effect of a search warrant, it has been 
67 [T]he Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police 
before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that 
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without 
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that 
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
68 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
69 Id. at 729. 
10 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
11 Jd. at 533. 
12 Comment, 17 KAN. L. REv. 512, 523 (1969). 
13Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1138 (1968). 
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argued that the cost in terms of money and manpower of procuring a 
warrant would be prohibitive, thus frustrating the university's educational 
purpose.74 It is pure speculation as to how much time and money would 
be expended if the university were required to seek a warrant before 
entering a dormitory room. Evidence of high cost might well be an 
indication that the university is making excessive use of its claimed right 
to enter dormitory rooms at will. As Camara stated there is no need to 
seek a warrant when the individual allows the official to enter, and this 
would be the normal situation.75 It is only the relatively unusual situation 
when the individual chooses to stand on his right to privacy that a warrant 
must be procured. Were this situation to occur frequently it may indicate 
that university officials are abusing their claimed right of entry at any 
time. The exercise of self-restraint and caution by university officials may 
be the best way to avoid excessive cost, as well as providing its own 
reward. Knowledge by university officials that they must rationally justify, 
to a magistrate, their need to enter a particular room may discourage 
impulsive entries based on the belief that there is an absolute right to 
enter at any time. Encouraging university officials to act more cautiously 
and rationally, might well promote the atmosphere of trust and coopera-
tiveness which is one of the goals of the university. "Due process of law 
is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance ... against 
those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which 
74 One reason for fearing that the warrant procedure would be financially costly could 
be the view that it would be necessary for universities to establish a separate warrant 
procedure when searching for a non-criminal violation of university regulations. This 
view maintains that when university officials are investigating non-criminal behavior 
"a magistrate located 'downtown' would probably be powerless to issue warrants. 
Consequently, the institution must develop within its own structures a surrogate 
competent to review applications for search warrants." Note, 3 GA. L. REv. 426, 456 
(1969). The cost in money and manpower of establishing such a separate warrant 
procedure might indeed be prohibitive. But suffice it to say, that aside from the 
wisdom and need for such a system it is questionable if the procedure would be 
constitutional. If the right to privacy in a dormitory room is recognized, that privacy 
cannot be breached absent a validly issued search warrant or established exceptions 
to the warrant procedure. There is no authority for the proposition that the warrant 
could be issued by anyone other than a magistrate. The fact that university officials 
are investigating non-criminal behavior does not eliminate the need to procure a 
warrant from a magistrate. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the 
court faced a factual situation where health inspectors were investigating non-criminal 
behavior. The court refused to uphold the health inspector's determination of the 
necessity for the inspection, and the court affirmed the need for a search warrant 
issued by a detached judicial party. When dealing with non-criminal activity, obviously 
the definition of probable cause to enter must be redefined; but, there is no alteration 
in the concept of who it is that must determine probable cause for entry. 
75 [A]s a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that 
a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants 
should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a 
citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate 
entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any 
change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of 
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967). 
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are bound to occur on ex parte consideration. " 76 
Aside from posing speculation on the financial costs and psychological 
effects of search warrants, university officials have not carried the burden 
of establishing that procuring a warrant would frustrate proper university 
functions. If the campus situation is truly volatile requiring immediate 
action then university officials are justified in bypassing the warrant 
requirement under the traditional emergency exception. 77 If the situation 
does not necessitate immediate action then there is no reason why 
university officials should not seek a warrant. It is always inconvenient 
to procure a search warrant, but inconvenience should not be the basis 
for negating the warrant requirement. 
STANDARD OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
If it is accepted that the fourth amendment requires university 
officials to procure a search warrant before entering a dormitory room, 
the next concern is what grounds must be established before the search 
warrant can be properly issued. The traditional test for issuing a 
search warrant is the establishment of probable cause to believe that 
seizable items, i.e., fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime, are 
located in the area to be searched.78 If the university officials are searching 
for evidence of a crime (e.g., unlawful possession of drugs) there appears 
no reason why the traditional standard of probable cause should not be 
applicable. Whether the university officials actually contemplated a 
criminal prosecution is irrelevant. Subjective intent is not the determining 
factor; what is significant is an objective determination that the university 
officials should have been aware that seizure of such items would subject 
the student to possible prosecution.79 
If the university officials are searching for an item that merely 
violates a university regulation (e.g., possession of firearms) and has no 
connection with a crime, then obviously the traditional definition of 
probable cause is inapplicable. Rather than offer facts establishing a 
reasonable ·belief that items connected with a crime are present, the 
university officials would be required to establish a "valid public interest 
[which] justifies the intrusion contemplated ... " 80 Presumably the valid 
public interest would be the right and need to enforce university 
regulations. Thus every suspected violation of university regulations would 
create a valid public interest in seeing those regulations enforced. Clearly 
the requirement to establish a reasonable belief of a violation of regulations 
does not place an unreasonable burden on the university. In fact since all 
76 Shaughnessey v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 224-5 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
77Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
78 B. SCHWARTZ, CoNSTITVTIONAL LAW 237 (1972). 
79 See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra. 
80 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 
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regulations are presumed to be reasonable,81 it has been argued that 
creating such a low standard of probable cause makes ·the search warrant 
automatic and the result is the same as if the warrant were eliminated 
entirely.82 The Supreme Court in Camara rejected the argument that 
lessening the standard of probable cause would lead to "rubber stamp" 
warrants. Even a lesser standard of probable cause to be passed on by a 
magistrate is preferable to leaving the decision to search to the discretion 
of the official conducting the search. The adequacy of probable cause 
must be determined "by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime."83 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire 84 and Spinelli v. United States,85 the requirement that 
a warrant be issued by a magistrate serves a valid purpose and is not a 
meaningless procedure. "It is not without significance that most of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells 
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice."88 
APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The wisdom and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule continue to 
engender heated debate,87 but the principle is quite clear: When govern-
ment officials violate the criminal defendant's fourth amendment right to 
privacy, they may not offer in evidence the fruits of such an illegal 
search.88 The fact that the criminal defendant is a student and the 
government officials are university officials should not in any way alter 
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to criminal prosecutions.89 
University officials cannot engage in illegal action and then present the 
fruits of such action to the prosecutor on a silver platter. Although 
the exclusionary rule should be applied to a criminal prosecution of a 
student, it is a more difficult question whether the rule is applicable to 
a university disciplinary proceeding. Whether the rule applies depends 
upon a determination of the nature of a university disciplinary proceeding. 
The application of the exclusionary rule is limited to proceedings 
·which are of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature.90 Cases are greatly 
81 Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729. 
82 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 554-5 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
83Aquilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). 
84 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
85 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
86Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
87 For a bibliography see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 267, n.24 (Powell, J., concurring). 
88 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
89 Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir .. 1971); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 
366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. McClosky, 217 Pa. Super. 
432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970). 
90Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886). 
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divided as to what constitutes a quasi-criminal proceeding;91 but, thus far 
the courts have uniformly rejected ilie proposition that university discipli-
nary proceedings are criminal in nature and effect.92 The plaintiffs in 
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College 93 contended that public institution 
disciplinary proceedings were analogous to criminal and juvenile proceed-
ings; thus, the procedural due process guarantees applicable in criminal and 
juvenile cases should be afforded to students facing possible expulsion 
and lesser disciplinary penalties. The court rejected this argument, stating 
that "[t]he nature and procedure of the disciplinary process ... should not 
be required to conform to federal processes of criminal law, which are ... 
designed for circumstances and ends unrelated to the academic commun-
ity." 94 Thus even if students succeed in having the courts recognize 
their fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches of 
a dormitory room, the most effective protection of that right-the 
exclusionary rule--may be denied to students if the university is willing 
to forego criminal prosecution and take disciplinary action. 
Since the courts refuse to analogize university disciplinary proceedings 
to criminal prosecutions, there is no binding precedent for applying the 
rule to disciplinary proceedings. If the exclusionary rule is to apply in 
university disciplinary proceedings the rule will probably have to evolve 
through the same process which led the courts to apply it in criminal 
cases. This means that students will have to appeal to ethical considera-
tions, 95 and/or prove that there is no other effective method of preserving 
fourth amendment rights. The appeal to ethical considerations seems 
particularly strong when considering the conduct of educators. 
[Educators] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discre-
tionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
91See generally Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 
F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962); In re 
Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 
S.E.2d 384 (1965); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964). 
92 Dixon v. Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State 
College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of 
California, 284 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967); Cornette 
v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d (Texas Ct. Civ. App. 1966). 
93 290 F. Supp. 622 {W.D. Mo. 1968). 
94 Id. at 629. 
95 The ethical consideration is whether, apart from the Constitution, a court should 
accept evidence obtained by a criminal act. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 
156, 221 N.E.2d (1966); Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 
(1966). The appeal to ethical considerations may indeed be persuasive to university 
officials. A survey of American colleges and universities revealed that "50 percent of 
the schools replying indicated that their hearing boards could not consider evidence 
obtained in violation of law or university regulations. Only 16 percent indicated that 
they would use such evidence, the remainder failing to respond." Project, 1970 DUKE 
L.J. 763, 770 (1970). 
438 AKRON LA.w REvmw [Vol. 7:3 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind 
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes.96 
But, the courts should be careful to note that merely because one 
recognizes the importance of educators setting an example, and one accepts 
this as a proper goal, it does not necessarily follow that this goa:l can 
only be achieved by adopting the exclusionary rule. 
Ethical considerations aside, the continued existence of the exclusion-
ary rule in its present form is under attack and the climate does not seem 
right for uncritical extension of the rule. Perhaps, the Chief Justice Burger 
has suggested, it is time to reexamine the effectiveness of the exclusionary 
rule and consider new alternatives.97 University disciplinary proceedings 
could provide a viable area for testing the effectiveness of proposed 
alternatives to the exclusionary rule. 
SUMMARY 
Unless the judiciary abandons its willingness to examine academic 
due process, it appears that university officials will be forced to recognize 
a student's right to privacy in a dormitory room. The concept of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy announced in Katz should clearly afford 
dormitory residents protection against arbitrary entry by university 
officials. To prove that a warrantless entry of a dormitory room is 
reasonable and not arbitrary, university officials have offered nothing 
except speculation as to the financial costs and supposed psychological 
effects of the warrant procedure. The burden of establishing the necessity 
for bypassing the warrant procedure rests upon university officials, and 
they cannot satisfy the burden by offering such unsubstantiated fears. The 
standard of probable cause for issuing a search warrant is well established 
in law, regardless of whether university officials are searching for evidence 
of a crime or merely for violation of university regulations. The only area 
for legitimate debate is the question of applying the exclusionary rule to 
university disciplinary proceedings. A debate and experimentation in this 
area could be a tremendous aid to the entire criminal law field. For it is 
in this area of university disciplinary proceedings that ·the courts are free 
of precedent binding them to the exclusionary rule. This area provides a 
microcosm in which to test and rethink the proposals that existed before 
Mapp v. Ohio 98 and that were again put forward in Chief Justice Burger's 
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.99 A reexamination of 
the merits of the exclusionary rule would not only achieve justice 
within the area of university disciplinary proceedings, it would provide 
valuable empirical data which could be used if the Supreme Court 
reconsiders the exclusionary rule's application to criminal prosecutions. 
96 Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
97 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). es 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 99 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971). 
